Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such counterexamples for friends of the PII, but then argue that no response is entirely satisfactory. Finally, I undermine some positive arguments for PII.
which accept the problematic qualitative arrangement broadly at face value, but attempt to reconcile it with PII.
The first such strategy is to identify the 'two' objects (I will call this the 'identity defence' of PII). The second is to find a relevant respect in which the objects are, after all, discernible (the 'discerning defence'). But there is a neglected third option: accept the qualitative description of the case, but deny that either of the alleged indiscernibles exist.
Instead, posit a single object, with the qualitative features which would have been possessed by the sum of the two indiscernibles, had they both existed and had a sum. In Black's case, this would involve claiming that his universe contains only a simple, partless object, which extends through a disconnected spatial region. This object is not a sphere, and doesn't contain any sphere as a part. I will call this third option the 'summing defence'.
In cases where duplication is qualitatively insignificant, the summing defence is equivalent to the identity defence. The putative duplicate desks are together indiscernible from a single desk, which is why principles of quantitative parsimony count against the 'two desks' hypothesis. So the summing defence -posit a single object qualitatively indiscernible from a sum of the 'two indiscernibles' -simply collapses into the obvious identity defence -posit a single object qualitatively indiscernible from each of the 'two indiscernibles'. Where duplication is qualitatively significant, however, the summing defence is distinctive, and, I shall argue, it is sometimes superior to both the identity defence and the discerning defence.
The identity defence
First consider the identity defence, as a response to cases which apparently involve qualitatively significant duplication. Prima facie, it might seem hopeless to claim that although a case is qualitatively equivalent to one containing two Fs (e.g. two spheres), it in fact contains only a single F. Nevertheless, John O'Leary-Hawthorne offers such a strategy to those who think that concrete particulars are bundles of universals (O'LearyHawthorne 1995; for more recent discussion, see Hawthorne and Sider 2002) . Bundle theorists may take Black's universe to contain a single bi-located sphere, one which is located both two miles from itself and in the same place as itself.
As O'Leary-Hawthorne points out, if particulars are entirely composed of universals, then it is plausible that they, like universals, are multiply-locatable. But oddities emerge as we consider the mereology of this situation. Suppose the sphere has mass 1kg, and volume 1m 3 , which is to say that the corresponding universals are elements of the multiply-located bundle. Now, what should we say about the sum of the 'two' spheres?
On the one hand, since the 'two' spheres are one and the same object, presumably the sum of those 'two' spheres is simply the sphere itself, which thus has mass 1kg and volume 1m 3 , and, indeed, a spherical shape. On the other hand, we might expect the sum of this 1kg sphere and that 1kg sphere to have mass 2kg and occupy a 2m 3 non-spherical scattered region; at least, it looks as if something in that universe has those features. The bundle theorist might try denying that the 'two' spheres have a sum. After all, they are spatially separated, and apparently don't have much causal interaction. But the sum of o plus o is guaranteed to exist if o does, for it is just o itself.
Perhaps the single sphere includes having volume exactly 2m 3 in its bundle, as well as having volume exactly 1m 3 . After all, it occupies two distinct 1m 3 regions simultaneously.
And maybe this is no worse than including being located at some distance from itself as well as being co-located with itself. But then the bundle also includes both being spherical and being two-sphere-shaped, and perhaps having mass exactly 1kg and having mass exactly 2kg. I, at least, am beginning to lose my grip on how property-exclusion is supposed to work here.
Perhaps we should relativised the single sphere's properties to various regions. 1 That is, it has mass 1kg relative to one of the spherical regions it occupies, has mass 1kg relative to the other spherical region, and has mass 2kg relative to the scattered two-sphere-shaped region. After all, we are contemplating objects which are wholly present in more than one place, and those who believe that persisting objects are wholly present at more than one time need to find a way of relativising property attributions to times, in order to account for change.
One reason for advocating a PII is that it is a consequence of some other metaphysical view. For example, a PII for properties follows from the identification of properties with sets, plus the co-extensionality criterion of identity for sets. More famously, a PII for concrete particulars follows from the identification of such particulars with bundles of universals. I cannot here assess all the various metaphysical theories which entail PIIs for entities of one sort or another. But in the face of putative counterexamples, we must count the cost of the various defences of PII in the balance against whatever benefits are promised by the metaphysical view in question.
A different kind of reason for advocating a PII is broadly empiricist, even antimetaphysical. This begins from the idea that all we can know of objects, all that is physically relevant about objects, is the properties they instantiate. After all, objects'
properties determine how they behave, and thus how we can interact with them. The substitution of one object for a 'distinct' yet indiscernible object would be just thatindiscernible -and could make no practical difference; facts about objects which go beyond facts about their qualitative features are inaccessible to us, and perhaps talk about such facts is just empty.
These are attractive thoughts, but only so long as we think about substituting indiscernibles one for another. It is surely true that it make no practical difference which of two indiscernible objects we are dealing with. But it may be of great practical importance whether we have one such object present or two (or two thousand). The twoobject case is discernible from the one-object case, at least where duplication is qualitatively significant. As we have seen, it is possible to salvage PII in the face of such cases. But concern for empirical significance provides us with no good reason to do so.
A related thought is this: quantitative parsimony is a theoretical virtue, so it is a good methodological principle to assume that objects are identical, unless there is reason to think that they are distinct. True enough, but we should recall that discernible differences are not the only reason to think that objects are distinct; their adding up to more than either taken separately is also a reason to recognise their multiplicity. where qualitatively significant duplication is concerned. And this amounts to a qualitative difference between the pairs. So the falsity of PII is compatible with the truth of the claim that whether 'two' objects are identical or distinct must have a qualitative ground.
One might object that the distinctness of the two objects in question must come before their having a sum which differs from either considered separately. It's because they are two that they add up significantly, not vice versa. I don't know whether this claim is true, but it seems to be on a par with the claim that the distinctness of two objects must come before their qualitative difference, that it is because they are two that they can differ qualitatively, not vice versa. But if this second claim is true, then advocates of PII must abandon their project of grounding 'identity facts' in qualitative discernibility and again we lose the motivation for PII.
However sometimes 'identity facts' seems to mean not facts about whether given objects are identical or distinct, but rather facts about which object is which. If a and b are distinct yet indiscernible, as the falsity of PII would permit, what fixes which is a, and which b? By assumption, no qualitative feature of either a or b is doing this work, yet a is a, and b is not, so we seem to have an ungrounded fact, a fact which can reasonably be called an 'identity fact'. The objects differ in which objects they are, without differing in any other respect.
There is a genuine, difficult problem in this vicinity, one concerning modal (transworld) identity conditions. Given that a and b are actual, we might wonder what could possibly determine which object in another possible world was a, and which b. But denying PII doesn't create extra difficulties here: even if PII is true, and a is discernible from all other actual objects, we can still ask which object is a in another possible world in which no object is an exact duplicate of the actual a. PII's guarantee that every object has an intraworld-unique collection of properties would provide neat universal modal identity conditions only if objects had all their properties essentially. (Mackie 2006 is an excellent, book-length discussion of modal identity conditions; it contains only three brief references to PII.)
So modal worries do not motivate PII. Is there a nonmodal 'which is which' fact, a fact which goes beyond the fact that the objects are distinct, a fact which goes ungrounded if PII is false? Maybe there is, but I, for one, cannot see what it is. Whether or not identity facts are always grounded is independent of whether PII is true.
